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Whereas full faith and credit is not applicable to questions of
jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata is. Hence, if a judgment
is rendered in one state where the application of the res judicata
principle precludes the parties from subsequently raising the question
of jurisdiction collaterally within that forum, then a court in
another state should be bound by full faith and credit to give
the prior judgment the same conclusiveness it enjoys in the
rendering state. Thus, the second forum will be bound to hold
the matter of jurisdiction, whether it be over the person or the
subject matter, as res judicata between parties to the previous
suit. Of course the application of the res judicata doctrine will
vary accordingly as that doctrine was evolved in the first forum,
but in all cases the rule of the first forum, if it is to receive
27
full faith and credit, must afford the contesting party due process.
It must also be noted that under extreme circumstances policy
considerations of the second forum have been allowed to defeat
the operation of full faith and credit.28 Consequently, it appears
that in an exceptional case a court in another state may permit
a collateral attack though the courts of the rendering state would
not.
With the above in mind, it will be noted that the Court in
the principal case makes no mention of the status of the Nebraska
law as to res judicata and collateral attack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Hence, the result arrived at in the instant case would
appear to be justified provided that the Nebraska judgment was
subject to collateral attack in that state; and unjustified if the
law of Nebraska is otherwise, unless the present case is deemed
one of those extremely rare cases in which the dictate of full faith
and credit is inoperative. In addition, if there were no controlling
decision in Nebraska, it seems that the Court in the principal
case was by that fact justified in applying its own rule as to
collateral attack of subject-matter jurisdiction 2 9
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American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932).
324 U.S. 154 (1945);

28 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel,

Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
29 Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Boskey &
Braucher, supra note 26, at 1011-12.
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practice action through his guardian ad litem against the City of
New York to recover damages for traumatic injuries he had sustained while a patient at a city hospital. Plaintiff's notice of claim
was filed within ninety days of his discharge from the hospital,
but not within ninety days of the last act of malpractice. The
last ninety days of plaintiff's stay in the hospital were devoted
solely to an effort by the defendant to alleviate the effects of its
malpractice through remedial therapy. The Supreme Court judgment in plaintiff's favor was reversed by the Appellate Division
on the ground that the notice of claim was not filed within the
ninety-day peried prescribed by the General Municipal Law.' The
Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, held that so
long as the defendant continued to treat the plaintiff for the
same or related illness out of which the malpractice arose, the
plaintiff's cause of action is not deemed to have accrued. Therefore, the plaintiff's notice, filed within ninety days of his discharge
from the hospital, was timely. Borgia v. City of New York,
12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1963).
The notice of claim provision under which this case arose is
analogous to the malpractice statute of limitations contained in the
Civil Practice Act. 2 In both situations, the statutory period of
limitations usually begins to run from the time the injury was
sustained.3 Therefore, the two statutes will be treated as involving
the same problems for the purposes of analysis in this article.
The courts have given a uniform interpretation to the two
statutes. In Conklin v. Draper,4 a statute of limitations case, the
court held that plaintiff's cause of action accrued when the defendant doctor negligently failed to remove arterial forceps from
the plaintiff's abdominal cavity, and not when the plaintiff subsequently discovered the foreign matter in her body.5 The court
I N.Y. MuNic. LAW § 50-e provides that a notice of claim against a
public corporation must be filed within ninety days after the claim arises.
The purpose of this short notice requirement is to enable the municipality
to make a prompt investigation of claims against it. Winbush v. City of
Mount Vernon, 306 N.Y. 327, 118 N.F_2d 459 (1954); Teresta v. City of
New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 108 N.E.2d 397 (1952) ; 1944 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15,
N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL TENTII ANNUAL REPORT AND STUDIES 265.
2 N.Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 50(1) provides that a malpractice action must
be commenced within two years after "the cause of action has accrued."
It should be noted that if the City of New York is a defendant, as in
the present case, the action must be brought within one year after it arose.
NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 394a-1.0(c). This requirement is
in addition to the notice of claim provision.
3 PRASHKER, NEW YORK PRACTICE 57 (4th Ed. 1959); 22 CARMODYWAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE § 9 (1956).
4229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't), aff'd inei.,
254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930).
5 The malpractice statute was also held to run from the time of injury
and not discovery in Golia v. Health Ins. Plan, 6 App. Div. 2d 884, 177
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reasoned that it is the injury itself and not its subsequent discovery
which gives rise to the cause of action, and hence the statute
begins to run at the earlier date.6 A similar result was reached
in Joseph v. McVeigh,7 a notice of claim case, wherein the court
held that the period for filing the notice of claim began to run
from the time the injury was actually sustained.
This harsh rule, which penalizes plaintiffs with valid causes
of action for their failure to discover their injuries within the
period of limitations, has long been the subject of criticism.8
Judicial attempts to ameliorate this situation have resulted in the
evolution of a new doctrine. According to this doctrine, known as
the "continuous treatment theory," a plaintiff's cause of action
does not accrue until the defendant physician completes his treatment, provided there is a continuing breach of duty by the defendant during the course of this subsequent treatment. Therefore, the statute of limitations would not begin to run until the
treatment ended, despite the fact that the negligence giving rise
to the cause of action may have occurred earlier, and the claim
would otherwise have been barred by the statute. 9 The theory
The
was first promulgated in Ohio in Gillette v. Tucker.10
Gillette rationale first appeared in New York case law with the
Supreme Court decision in Sly v. Van Lengen.11 In both the
Gillette and Sly cases the courts held that the plaintiff's cause of
action accrued not when the defendant physician left a sponge
in plaintiff's body during the course of an operation, but when
he terminated treatment years later without having removed the
sponge. The rationale of both cases was that the failure to remove
the sponge amounted to a continuing breach of duty, and hence
N.Y.S.2d 550, (2d Dep't 1958), aff'd nere., 7 N.Y.2d 931, 165 N.E.2d 578,
197 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1960); Budoff i% Kessler. 284 App. Div. 1049, 135
N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1954) (memorandum decision); Ranalli v. Breed,
251 App. Div. 750, 297 N.Y.Supp. 688 (2d Dep't 1937) (memorandum
decision), aff'd mere., 277 N.Y. 630, 14 N.E.2d 195 (1938).
6229 App. Div. 227, 230, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529, 532 (1st Dep't), aff'd
It is interesting to note that
mem., 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930).
only two states have a statutory provision tolling the malpractice statute
of limitations until discovery, i.e., Alabama (ALX. CoDE tit. 7, §25(1)
(1958)) and Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §52-584 (1960)). See
LoUISELL & WILLiAms, TaIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAsES 1 13.07
(1960).
7285 App. Div. 386, 137 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Ist Dep't), aff'd mer., 309
N.Y. 877, 131 N.E.2d 289 (1955).
SLillich, The MalpracticeStatute of Limitations in New York and Other
Jurisdictions,47 CopnmLrL L.Q. 339, 343 (1962). See also PRAsHIM, op. cit.
supra note 3; Note, The Statute of Limitations Applicable to Malpractice
Actions in New York, 11 N.Y.U. IwmrA. L. REv. 190, 198 (1955).
0 See Lillich, supra note 8, at 344.
10 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
11 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y. Supp. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
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the cause of action accrued only at the end of treatment. 12 Since
the Sly decision, the continuous treatment theory has become a
generally accepted doctrine in the lower New York courts. 13
In 1960, the Court of Appeals indicated its probable acceptance
of the continuous treatment theory in Hammer v. Rosen.14 The
court mentioned the theory with approval though recognizing that
its adoption was unnecessary to its holding in plaintiff's favor since
the action had been brought within the statutory period from the
last act of malpractice. 15
The Court of Appeals, in the instant case, recognized that the
approval of the continuous treatment theory in Hammer was mere
dicta for the reasons given above, and that it now had to decide
for the first time whether to accept or reject the doctrine. 16
The majority, Chief Judge Desmond writing the opinion, unequivocally approved the doctrine, holding that the "'accrual' [of
the cause of action] comes only at the end of treatment." 17
The Court reasoned that the continuous treatment theory is the
"fairer one" in that it does not present a plaintiff with the dilemma
of either interrupting needed treatment and serving the defendant
doctor with a summons, or continuing treatment and having his
cause of action barred by the statute of limitations.' 8 The Court
intimated that its rationale would apply to ordinary malpractice
statute of limitations cases as well as notice of claim cases. 19 It
did, however, attach one caveat to its apparently broad application
of the doctrine: plaintiff's cause of action will only be deemed
to arise at the end of treatment if such treatment is "for the
same or related illnesses or injuries, continuing after the alleged
acts of malpractice, not mere continuity of a general physician-

12/d.

at 422, 198 N.Y. Supp. at 610; Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St.

106, -, 65 N.E. 865, 870 (1902).
13 See Piedmont v. Society of New York Hosp., 25 Misc. 2d 41, 204
N.Y.S.2d 592 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Steele v. City of New York, 12 Misc. 2d
605, 177 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Nervick v. Fine, 195 Misc. 464, 87
N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 275 App. Div. 1043, 91 N.Y.S.2d 924
(2d Dep't 1949).
14 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
15 Id. at 379-80, 165 N.E.2d at 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
16 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155-56, 187 N.E.2d 777,
778, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1963).
17 Id. at 155, 187 N.E.2d at 778, 237 N.Y.S2d at 321.
18 Id. at 156, 187 N.E.2d at 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321. Ironically the continuous treatment theory has also been justified on the ground that it protects
the defendant by not subjecting him to harassment by plaintiffs suing prematurely before he has had time to correct his original mistake during the
course of subsequent treatment. Schmitt v. Esser, 178 Minn. 82, 226 N.W.
196 (1929).
19 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 187 N.E.2d 777,
778, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1963).
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patient relationship." 20 Thus, the continuous treatment theory will
not be applied if subsequent treatment is not for the same malady
as that which was being treated when the malpractice occurred.
The dissent in the present case agreed with the majority that
the application of the continuous treatment theory in Hammer was
only by way of dicta, and hence argued that the case was not
controlling. The dissent went further, however, and argued that
even the cases cited by the majority in which the continuous
treatment theory was the ratio decidendi were distinguishable
from the present case.21 In these other cases, the dissent urged,
there appeared "some plausible theory for concluding that the
injury complained of was the result of a continued course of
treatment, and not merely the result of one or more separate and
distinct acts. No such theory is available to the plaintiffs in the
case at bar." 22
The distinction drawn by the dissent appears to be a valid
one. In these previous cases, the physician could have corrected
or alleviated his original negligence. His failure to do so amounted
to a continuing breach of duty.2 3 The statute was rightly held
to run from the end of treatment in cases where the defendant:
24
1) proceeded to treat on the basis of an incorrect diagnosis,
2) left a foreign object in the plaintiff and failed to remove it
during subsequent treatment, 25 3) set a cast improperly at the
outset, 26 or 4) continued to beat the patient
as a means of
27
psychiatric therapy throughout the treatment.
20

1d. at 157, 287 N.E.2d at 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 322.

For a discussion

of this judicial criterion for determining when the cause of action accrues
see LoursEuL & WILLIAMs, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES ff 13.09
(1960).
21 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 160, 187 N.E.2d 777, 781,
23722N.Y.S.2d 319, 325 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 160, 187 N.E.2d at 781, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 324 (dissenting
opinion).

23 See Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 422, 198 N.Y. Supp. 608, 610,
(Sup. Ct. 1923): "[P]laintiff's cause of action accrued as much by reason
of the alleged continuous breach of dity . . . in failing to remove the
sponge . . . as it did because of the alleged negligent act of the defendant
on the day of the operation when he sewed up the opening without removing
the foreign substance. According to the complaint the tort was a contznurn9
one." (Emphasis added.)
24 Williams v. Elias, 141 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941); Hotelling v.
Walther, 169 Or. 559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942); Peteler v. Robinson, 81 Utah
535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932).
25 Sly v. Van Lengen, supra note 23; Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St.
106,2665 N.E. 867 (1902).
De Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); Schanil
v. Branton, 181 Minn. 381, 232 N.W. 708 (1930).
27Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1960) (dicta). See Anderson, The Application of Statutes of Limitations
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In the present case, however, the last act of malpractice had
occurred three months before the plaintiff's discharge from the
hospital. The defendant spent these last three months attempting
to alleviate the effects of its original negligence. There is no
allegation that the defendant breached any duty toward the plaintiff
during this time. 28 It would appear, therefore, that the cases
relied upon by the majority are inapposite.
The reasons advanced by the majority in support of its
adoption of the continuing treatment theory are also open to
question. The Court wanted to avoid placing plaintiffs in the
predicament of either having to interrupt treatment or having
29
their causes of action barred by the statute of limitations.
But, logically, it would appear that not many patients would wish
to continue in the care of a physician against whom they intended
to commence a malpractice action.
Despite these criticisms, it cannot be denied that the present
case has definitely established the continuous treatment theory as
a judicial guideline in New York, in the construction of both
the notice of claim statute and the malpractice statute of limitations.
This interpretation will undoubtedly also apply in the construction
of the new Civil Practice Law and Rules which becomes effective
September 1, 1963.30 Under this statute, as under the Civil
Practice Act, the period of limitations begins to run when the
cause of action 31accrues, and not upon subsequent discovery of
the malpractice.
By retaining the "cause of action" theory, and refusing to
adopt a discovery theory, the Legislature has made it necessary
for the courts to adopt such doctrines as the continuous treatment
theory, and expand them as far as they were expanded in the
present case in order to avoid unjust results. The Civil Practice
Law and Rules alleviates the problem somewhat by providing
for an extension from two to three years in the malpractice statute
of limitations.32 But it appears that the cleavage between legislative

to Actions Against Physicians and Surqeons, 25 INSUR. COUNSEL J. 237,
239-40 (1958); Note, 16 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 101, 103 (1941).
28 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 160, 187 N.E.2d 777.
781, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 325 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
29 Id. at 156, 187 N.E.2d 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
30 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES § 214.
31 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES § 203 (a).
The revisers indicate that
this section basically brings forward the equivalent section under the Civil
Practice Act. 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15, FIrr PRELIMINARY REPORT OF
THE SENATE

FINANCE COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE CIVIL

PRACTICE

ACT 30-31.
32 This extension will also alleviate the problem of deciding whether or
not the malpractice statute of limitations is to be applied to a particular
cause of action. It was held under the Civil Practice Act that a nurse
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enactment and judicial interpretation will continue until a statute
such as was recommended by the Law Revision Commission in
1942 is passed. 33 This statute would toll the running of the
period of limitations until the plaintiff discovered his cause of
action. There would, however, be a six year maximum period of
limitations computed from the time the act of malpractice occurred.
Such a statute would not be without precedent in New York. The
present fraud statute of limitations does not begin to run until
discovery. 34 The recommended statute would relieve the courts
of the burden of devising means to circumvent the present harsh
statutory standards. 30

is. not engaged in the practice of medicine, and therefore the three-year
personal injury statute of limitations, rather than the two-year malpractice
statute applied to her. Isenstein v. Malcamson, 227 App. Div. 66, 236 N.Y.
Under the Civil Practice Law and Rules,
Supp. 641 (1st Dep't 1929).
Whether the nurse's tort is malpractice or not, the statutory period is three
years. N.Y. Cv. PRAC. LAW & RULES §214(5),(6).
Com.m'N REP. (A)
33 1942 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW REvisiox
14.
Attempts to take advantage of this
34 N.Y. Civ. PiAc. AcT § 48(5).
more liberal statute by framing what is essentially a malpractice cause of
action in terms of fraud, have generally been unsuccessful. Hammer v.
Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960); Tulloch v.
Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N.Y. Supp. 139 (3rd Dep't 1926). Lillich,
The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Otier Jurisdictions,
47 Coau.FI L.Q. 339, 352 (1962).
32 Lillich, supra note 34, at 343-44.

